Aquinas 101: Lesson Twelve

Saint Thomas Aquinas by Carlo Crivelli, downloaded from Wikipedia

Lesson 12: Form and Matter

The video was by Fr. James Brent, OP.  The short video starts by questioning what is truth, love, and justice. The answer is form; that is, form answers the question about what a thing is. He talks about the differences between forms as thought of by Plato and forms as thought of by Aristotle. And when he talks about the essences (or nature) of things, he is talking about forms. Matter is discussed:

matter is the universal substratum of pure potentiality that does not exist on its own except in union with a form, which makes it to be this or that kind of matter.

And then, all things in nature are composites of matter and form. This is called hylomorphism. And "the form of a thing is its act and the matter of a thing is its potency." Form is the intelligibility of a thing. It answers our question of what they are.

From the readings, I found the selection from Copleston to be most helpful. The first quote is about prime matter:

Aquinas thought, we must arrive at the concept of a purely indeterminate potential element which has no definite form of its own and no definite characteristics. This he called 'first matter' (materia prima). Visible matter, secondary matter, is already informed and possesses determinate characteristics

 The second is about the composite of form and matter:

According to Aquinas, therefore, every material thing or substance is composed of substantial form and first matter. Neither principle is itself a thing or substance; the two together are the component principles of a substance. And it is only of the substance that we can properly say that it exists. 'Matter cannot be said to be; it is the substance itself which exists'

The audio lecture, "Introduction to Metaphysics: Form and Matter; Substance and Accidents" by Fr. Thomas Joseph White, OP, is a good lecture, but I found it very difficult to follow toward the end. Fr. White talks about three lectures, and they can be found on SoundCloud. Fr. White begins with two definitions of principles, of which the second will be used in this lecture: "constitutive causes what makes a given thing the kind of thing that it is."

The aim of the lecture is: "Elaborate a metaphysical science or universal form of thought that is insightful and realistic" (and Aquinas thinks this is possible). Form and matter are two co-constitutive principles of a thing in the material world. They are not things themselves.

He next helpfully tells us what a natural form is not (and if you're a beginner with this, this use may be foreign to you): It is not:

1. the shape of a thing
2. static (meaning that the essence of a thing continues through change)
3. not an accidental form or an artifact like a house or a painting (things which are made)

 Rather a natural form is:

1. an intrinsic principle of determination that gives a stable identity to a given reality through time
2. it is the cause of the realities having a given identity or intelligible essence in and through all the changes it undergoes it is that which persists through change
3. principle of internal organization of the material parts of a given reality so that those parts can be identified only as parts of it
4.  essential source of stable  properties
5.  foundation for teleological outcomes

(At this point, you may be thinking Fr. White is talking over your head, I can grasp what he is saying, but I don't feel comfortable re-stating these definitions; it may be helpful to re-read these several times).

When speaking about matter, Aquinas may be using one of two definitions:

1. parts of matter (that is, at this level,  all matter has form, and can be further broken down into parts) (examples: heart, lung, and eyes are matter which partly make up a human being)
   
2.  prime matter or pure potency (at this level, matter which does not have form, refer to the Copleston quote above) (about this Fr White states: "principle of radical indetermination  present in all physical things")
   

With these we have a fundamental capacity for alteration, where something continues to be through change. Even the new things are made from older things. (Perhaps I should be used to using the word substance instead of things, for this is the topic of the next part).

In discussing substances Fr, White is talking about an individual thing (matter and form), and it has properties which could be termed accidents. He talks about categorical modes of being which inhere in a substance. So he is moving on to Aristotle's categories. And he reads from Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle which I found here. I'll quote the paragraphs he is reading from:

891. For it should be noted that a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways.

(1) This occurs in one way when the predicate states what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated.

892. (2) A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either (a) essentially and absolutely and (i) as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or (ii) as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or (b) it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation.

(3) A predicate is referred to a subject in a third, way when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. (a) In one way, that from which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the subject; and (i) if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of attire, as when it is said that Socrates is shod or clothed. (ii) But if it is a measure of the subject, then, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, (aa) the predicament is taken either in reference to time, and so it will be when; or (bb) if it is taken in reference to place and the order of parts in place is not considered, it will be where; but if this order is considered, it will be position. (b) In another way, that from which the predicate is taken, though outside the subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject of which it is predicated. (i) And if it is from the viewpoint of the principle, then it is predicated as an action; for the principle of action is in the subject. (ii) But if it is from the viewpoint of its terminus, then it will be predicated as a passion; for a passion is terminated in the subject which is being acted upon.

Fr. White talks about a chart (which we can't see) which lists the categories of being, so hopefully the following list is correct (I did not always use the same examples)

1. substance (a human being)
2. quantities (size, tall, short)
3. qualities (capable of doing math)
4. relations (such as to a father)
5. habits (like the wearing of shoes)
   
6. location in time
7. location in place
8. position (sitting or standing)
9. actions (talking)
10. passions (i.e. passive, like listening)

Further Resources (which is optional) is on SoundCloud (and I did not have a chance to listen):Jeffrey Brower - Form-Matter Composition.